

## CHICAGO JOURNALS



History of Science Society

Dirk R. Johnson. Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism.

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Source: Isis, Vol. 102, No. 3 (September 2011), pp. 571-572

Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science Society

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/663049

Accessed: 04/10/2011 13:11

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what is widely assumed about the militaristic tone in German bacteriology, and it is hardly worth the elaborate methodology Hänseler employs. It is also regrettable that Koch's laboratory notes have not been consulted. While Hänseler is right to characterize these as a genre that offers incomplete fragments instead of a grammatically organized text, I don't see how this can serve as a justification to exclude them from analysis. Instead, it would have been tempting to search in this place for language that is, in Hans Blumenberg's words "edging on the nonconceptual."

Hänseler deserves credit for considerably expanding our understanding of the role of language in Robert Koch's bacteriology and for developing and employing an innovative methodology. Yet, suffering as it does from heuristic limitations, this book may turn out not to be the last word on the matter.

CHRISTOPH GRADMANN

**Dirk R. Johnson.** *Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism.* x + 240 pp., bibl., index. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. \$85 (cloth).

Dirk R. Johnson's *Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism* not only argues for the validity of its main thesis but also presents a valuable overview and critique of the historiography surrounding its subject matter. It will most likely become an important text to contend with, for or against, in future scholarship.

Unlike previous commentators who have preferred to see in Nietzsche's middle- and lateperiod writings either a fundamental agreement with or a misunderstanding of the tenets of Darwinism, Johnson here seeks to demonstrate that neither was the case. While Nietzsche was attracted to the naturalism and apparent amorality of Darwinism, he came to have fundamental disagreements as he developed his own understanding of nature, human nature, the origin of values, and the dichotomy of altruism and egotism. Nor can a clear distinction be made between Nietzsche's rejection of Darwin and of his followers. From his work on the book David Strauss: The Confessor and the Writer onward he developed an increasingly polemical, personalized style that saw certain individuals as being manifestations of particular types of will. While Strauss served as an early model for Nietzsche's engagement with and critiques of science within culture, he would go on to use just this method on Darwin in his later works.

Johnson also emphasizes the continuity in Nietzsche's thinking about Darwin from his middle to his late period. In examining the French moralistes such as La Rochefoucauld—who, like Darwin, appeared to ground their understanding of human beings in amoral drives and instincts—Nietzsche came to recognize that the altruism/egotism distinction present in both was the manner in which unchallenged Christian moral values still stood at the heart of their estimation of the natural world. His apparently sudden attack on Darwin and Darwinians in this regard was a change more of style than of fundamental focus.

Furthermore, drawing on the narrative of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Johnson challenges the view that the *Übermensch* represents a higher evolutionary stage of man, in light of the eternal return of the same, which ultimately means that every type, the greater *and* the lesser, will return. From this he further argues that Nietzsche's concept of breeding (*Züchtung*) should be read more as self-overcoming than as a question of survival. Indeed, the *Übermensch* is more, not less, likely to perish in the Darwinian state of nature than are the manifestations of other types of wills.

Nietzsche took his conception of the Übermensch in part from the ancient Greek conception of the agon, a ritualized, sublimated means by which a higher type can locate equals and challenge them within established terms so that they can direct their powers outward. The point is not to eliminate one's adversary, or to replace one truth with some greater truth, as it may be conceived of in a Darwinian struggle, but the ability to overcome an equal or stronger opponent and thereby assert and rejoice in one's own will to power, recognizing it as such.

The entire second section of the book is given over to a close reading of The Genealogy of Morals. Here Johnson argues that the text is "a single and sustained polemic against the extension of Darwinian premises to the important study of man" (p. 172). It is not so much an attack on Christianity as an explication of the typology of the ascetic and how it emerges from the slave revolt in values to push aside other types. In this context the Genealogy serves to show how science came to challenge Christianity as the herald of ressentiment, for it could not replace it unless it was a form of it. The will to truth in both is constant, but in Darwinism it serves to hide its own will beneath a veil of disinterestedness, positing a dualism between progress and obscurantism instead of the Judeo-Christian dichotomy of good and evil.

Conceptually, some readers may take exception to the author's aggressive employment of quotation marks to use problematic terms in NOTICE: This Materies way be protected by copyright law. (Title 17 US Code)

unproblematic ways, sidestepping thorny terminological debates about "facts," "development," "logic," "virtue," "nature," and so on. Also, it would have been interesting if the text had delved deeper into the distinction between the Darwinian concept of species and Nietzsche's own typology of wills, for on the face of it the arguments raised against one could also have a more direct bearing on the other.

Yet these are only minor foibles in a work that is a welcome addition to the scholarship surrounding one of the most penetrating critiques of science to emerge from the nineteenth century. In defending the autonomy and legitimacy of his intellectual position, while also stressing its continuities and context, Johnson walks a difficult but rewarding path between the two extremes in the historiography of Nietzsche's thought, to the benefit of all.

BENJAMIN MITCHELL

Gérard Jorland. Une société à soigner: Hygiène et salubrité publiques en France au XIXe siècle. 361 pp., bibl., index. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2010. €27 (paper).

The ability of human beings to shape the world around them has been a steady source of fascination and concern. In our time, the prime concern is human-induced climate change. In the nineteenth century, the sense of urgency was focused not on industry's impact on the earth, but on people. Concerns about public health led to numerous scientific studies and legislation that ranged from modest to ambitious, depending on where and who you were. Gérard Jorland's monograph *Une société à soigner* offers an insightful new perspective on public health in nineteenth-century France.

One distinctive feature of Jorland's work is its starting point. Histories of public health in nineteenth-century France typically begin with the Napoleonic era or with the emergence of a corps of professional hygienists and sociomedical investigators in the 1820s. Alternately, there are studies of the bacteriological revolution that focus on the last third of the century. Jorland begins in the late eighteenth century with the chemist Antoine Lavoisier, whom he credits with establishing the paradigm that would frame public health investigations in France. For, according to Jorland, historians who have approached public health in nineteenth-century France from a medical point of view have overlooked how much the movement was indebted to chemistry for its modus operandi.

Jorland supports this compelling thesis by

examining numerous public health concerns (contaminated water, sewers, slaughterhouses, prostitutes) through the lens of chemical processes—in particular, fermentation and putrefaction. Thus, rotting industrial and household waste combined with the water supply, which, in turn, combined with the human population to produce disease and death. Human populations both produced and were subjected to numerous chemical processes that varied depending on their environment. Public health investigators, as Jorland describes them, sought to understand disease by analyzing how the human body reacted to different features of its environment (especially the urban environment).

The scope of Jorland's work extends beyond the purely scientific dimensions of public health to encompass familiar turning points in the political history of France. He singles out 1848 as a pivotal moment not simply for French republicanism, but also for public health, because it witnessed the eclipse of the Enlightenment belief in progress and the perfectibility of human beings. Violent clashes between Parisian workers and the bourgeois national government transformed previous concerns about the misery of the laboring population into anxiety about the decadence and degeneracy of the workers.

In several chapters Jorland compares public health in France, Britain, and the United States. He contrasts the French approach, which was predicated on the belief that poverty led to higher rates of sickness and death, with the British and American approaches, which instead posited sickness and death as the causes of poverty. This allowed the British and Americans to invest in sanitary measures that targeted water supplies or public spaces, while the French grappled with the contentious task of identifying and targeting the source of poverty itself. According to Jorland, this was one reason that the British and Americans were more successful in passing legislation to address public health concerns than were the French. Indeed, throughout his book Jorland observes that Britain led in public health while France lagged behind; he even goes so far as to state that the "Pasteurian" revolution took place in Britain in the 1860s.

In his conclusion, Jorland asserts that political and demographic factors were the chief reasons that the French state did not adopt a coercive role in public health as early as or to the extent that Britain and the United States did. The series of revolutions so familiar to French political history meant that no regime in nineteenth-century France had sufficient legitimacy to impose extensive reforms. Furthermore, such reforms were not as necessary in France as they